Can individual and community conservation ethic and creativity be rewarded through IPP

Anil K Gupta

The Intellectual Property Protection laws in the pre and post-TRIPS era differ significantly in respect of, a) lack of harmonization of IP laws among countries, b) absence of product patent in most developing countries, c) very weak enforcement of even the existing provisions of IP laws with regard to copyright or patents and much lesser domestic inventive activity vis-à-vis the global patents filed locally. Given such a situation, the stronger IP regime can influence the environmental conditions in developing and developed countries in several ways such as (a) lack of transfer of proprietary patented technologies from north to south which can substitute environmental unfriendly practices, generate environment friendly and efficient alternatives and remedy the negative environmental externalities of various ongoing industrial processes (such as hazardous wastes), (b) restriction of access to technologies which if widely used, could improve the environmental conditions considerably, (c) introduction of technologies with high production potentials but of which sufficient public scrutiny may not have taken place except by the usual certification agencies (some of the transgenic crops), (d) incentives for private investment in technologies which will generate a public good through a system of incentives or licensing by national governments or international organizations for wider access, and (e) access to global markets for grassroots green innovations that may provide incentives for international venture funds to invest in green innovations from one country to generate enterprises there or in another country. The linkage between innovation, investment and enterprise is likely to become a stronger in the presence of stronger IP regime.

To what extent have IPP systems actually influenced environment is a matter that would require a considerably bigger research study. Available evidence is scanty if at all. I am discussing in this paper the implications that can strengthen the case for stronger but modified intellectual property, contributing to better environmental impacts provided (a) third party institutions emerge to mediate transactions between inventors and potential users. In the absence of such intermediation, what most NGOs and many third world governments plead for, is a system of subsidization by the inventors of the larger society, (b) modification in patent laws take place so that every patent applicant has to certify that knowledge and/or resources used from third world have been obtained lawfully and rightfully (through prior informed consent), and in cases where necessary through appropriate benefit sharing mechanisms, (c) respect the cultural values about prevention of patents on the life forms in general but on naturally discovered plants or animals in particular if a country so desires, and (d) providing researchers’ exemption in plant patents just as it is provided in case of plant variety protection. I also discuss the problem that arise out of issuance of improper patents on biodiversity and associated knowledge of third world in the northern countries leading to violation of local environmental ethics. Therefore, I broaden the boundary of interface between IPR and environment to include the ethical aspects of environment rather than restrict to only material aspect of environment.

Article 16 of the Convention on Biological Diversity dealing with access to and transfer of technology and Article 19 dealing with handling of biotechnology and its benefits have been rather neglected and under-appreciated goals of CBD (Stokes and Mugabe,1999). The review of the decisions of conferences of parties including COP4 shows that nothing substantive has been achieved so far. The project portfolio of Global Environment Facility (GEF) also shows that transfer of technology has not been a major objective (ibid, 1999). To the extent that the transfer has been affected adversely due to weak IPR regimes in developing countries, one can appreciate the linkage between IPR and transfer of technology. However, the next link in the argument about these technologies is also leading to better environment, we need more evidence. For some of the technologies such as pest resistant transgenic crops (e.g. Bt Cotton), the owners of this technology have been keen to transfer it to developing countries. But due to perceived environmental risks associated with such crops, some countries have not encouraged experiments or large scale trials of this technology. Apparently, the negative environmental impact of chemical pesticides which is well documented (see Our Stolen Future by Colborrn and others, 1997) has been considered of less consequence compared to the potential laws from Bt Cotton due to suspected genetic drift. On the other hand, the herbicide tolerant transgenic crop technologies are certainly not environment friendly and need to be discouraged. The proprietary nature of the technology protected by patents influences the transaction cost involved in transfer of such technology. However, where transfer is not the issue, (the absorption of technology is) the impacts are caused by domestic policy of a country rather than the proprietary nature of patented technology. We have to be careful in attributing the causal connection between environment and IPR.

The IPR can influence technology transfer by way of (a) the price of technology to cover the cost of R&D, (b) by requiring institutions for enforcement, (c) requiring concession for foreign direct investment through 100 per cent subsidiaries without technological spillovers, and (d) competition policy which may conflict with trade distorting monopolies. Stokes and Mugabe (1999) conclude after reviewing various studies that stronger IPR protection was not positively correlated with increased investment or technology flows. The world development report of World Bank cautioned about the negative impact of the stronger IPR regime on the growth of technological development (WDR, 1998 in Butler 1998 quoted in Stokes and Mugabe, 1999). Article 7 of TRIPS provides the scope for evaluating the implications of stronger IPR regime on the "promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producer and user of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations". The biotechnological capabilities are evolving in many developing countries very fast, thanks to the mechanization of many of the processes. Therefore, the basic biotechnological tools will no more be an issue. The problem could arise when some of the gene sequences or other life forms based on raw materials from developing countries will not be accessible to the gene donor countries because of restriction on such patents in those countries. To what extent such technologies will impact on environment remains to be seen. If a biotechnological technique can help a crop to grow in highly saline or alkaline region, then environmental as well as economic impacts are obvious. The argument that "Biosafety regime may be a more appropriate mechanism for protecting human, animal, and environment (al) well being than a patent regime is an assertion (Stokes and Mugabe, 1999) which even logically does not hold the ground. The Biosafety regime, first of all, it should be noted, has no inherent contradiction or trade off with patents. One can have both. Further what patents do is to provide incentive for exploration. If some micro organisms can help in reversing the degradation of soil in highly mined areas or similarly other degraded areas, should such micro organisms be not searched? If such micro organisms are found in developing countries by companies based in the West, one could argue for some benefit sharing to become obligatory. However, in the absence of exploration and IPR protection, why would anybody invest in exploring such microorganisms which help in reversing the degradation. The Biosafety regime can only ensure that if any liability were to arise on account of any negative side effect, the responsibility should rest with the provider of technology. This is a problem that can be easily tackled in technology transfer contracts by appropriate liability clauses. Biosafety norms, thus, by themselves will not lead to reversal of degradation and improvement of environment. These will only help in increasing the transaction cost such that a risky technology may be prevented from entering a country.

The review of Article 27.3 (b) provides opportunities for both developing and developed countries to include certain ethical and institutional responsibilities. The argument about excluding all living matters from patent protection including micro organisms may appear philosophically pro-life but is actually a means of impeding the flow of biotechnologies among the southern countries as well as from north to south. Even if patenting is allowed in a country for microorganisms, it is not necessary that every application must necessarily be accepted even if the same had been accepted elsewhere. The environmental and human health grounds still provide a reasonable basis for preventing granting of patent, notwithstanding the experience of EPO in Onco mouse case. Stokes and Mugabe (1999) demonstrate that weak IPR protection has not been a major barrier to the acquisition of proprietary technologies in Zimbabwe. However, the study does not explore the extent to which weak IPR regime prevented domestic investment in development of proprietary technologies. They, however, add that some firms in the country are pleading for stronger IPP regimes. Their argument that implementation of TRIPS couldn’t effectively protect "against the development or import of potentially hazardous technologies into a country is valid and thus by implication suggest the need for exploring various other institutional means of achieving this goal including Biosafety norms. It should, however, be noted that in the absence of Biosafety protocol the IPP laws will have to be suitably amended by the concerned nation state so as to prevent import of potentially hazardous biotechnologies in a given country. It is likely that at the time of review of this article, many countries will plead for more time to achieve consistency with the goals of harmonization of intellectual property rights. However, an argument that has not been given a fair chance is about the relationship of IP protection with domestic inventiveness. The assumption that developing countries are knowledge poor or cannot produce knowledge of significant importance is not valid in the light of the experience of Honey bee network and Chinese leadership in the field of herbal patents.

Cecilia Oh (1999) argues about the popular concern of many developing countries, `that the control of nature and distribution of new life forms by TNCs may affect their food security and development prospects. She also provides three different options with the last one being about maintaining status quo in regard to Article 27.3b, while the first two require total exclusion of biological materials and derivatives thereof including microorganisms. It is not clear as to how could any TNC distribute its technology without approval from national governments under respective legal provisions. Further, if farmers do not find these technologies worthwhile, would they buy these? And if not, why would TNC bother to introduce these technologies. It is obvious that instead of strengthening civil society and its capacity to debate and evolve pragmatic policies, many governments prefer to be protected from making choices that are difficult on efficiency as well as moral grounds. I do not see any merit in the argument against protection of Intellectual Property for micro organisms given their strategic role in remedying pollution, reversing degradation, decomposing some of the hitherto non-biodegradable waste like plastics and in developing biotechnological options for eliminating use of chemical pesticides and other toxins( ofcourse these could be used for many other purposes as well). It appears that biggest gainer from the suspension of Article 27.3 (b) or its modification as suggested by Third World Network would be the polluting industries (not under pressure to invest in research on bioremediation because the investment would not be recovered in the absence of IPP, the bioremediation industry will also not attract capital in the absence of assured returns), the chemical pesticide industry which is dominated by the TNCs and in many cases by the same TNCs which also have strong interest in biotechnology industry, and perhaps those governments which do not want to invest in domestic biotechnology industry. The fact that many African, Latin American, and Asian countries are developing domestic capabilities in DNA fingerprinting and evolving transgenic applications may create its own dynamics at the time of the review of this article. Microorganisms are unlikely to be excluded from the purview of IPP and for good reasons. Many of the critics of biotechnology do not realize that unlike conventional industrial technology, same biotechnological infrastructure can be used for a very vast variety of products. The fixed cost remain more or less same. Further the potential for closing the technology gap in the field of biotechnology is much higher than in conventional industrial technology.

The weaker IPP regime in a developing country may influence the transfer of proprietary patented technologies from north or other southern countries in five ways. I discuss below the implications of each alternative and suggest the way one can analyze it.

The plastic is one of the major pollutant in most developing countries because of its cheap cost and easy accessibility. There are numerous studies that demonstrate the effect of plastic waste on environment. It is possible that a patented technology dealing with biodegradation of plastics through specific microorganisms may not be transferred, if it is easy to replicate. Only when markets for given technology are very big, the incentives to obtain intellectual property in an unauthorized manner are very low, the transfer of technology may take place even with weak IP regime. Cocoa Cola has been able to maintain its trade secret for so long and may continue to do so for a long time in future. In such a case, the technology is protected through trade secret.

The environment friendly alternatives may include making particle board from rice husk or other biowaste for which proprietary technology exist in India and may not be transferred to some country which does not respect the IP protection. This is a technology which can substitute the consumption of wood and thus contribute to improvement of environment. It is important to note that National Research Development Corporation (NRDC) in India filed for patents on behalf of Indian inventors in various countries in south and north precisely because it saw market potential in those countries. The Indian provision of process patent wouldn’t have been sufficient for the purpose. NRDC has licensed this technology to several entrepreneurs within India and South East Asian countries on non-exclusive basis.

c) Introduction of technologies with high production potential but of which sufficient public scrutiny may not have taken place.

This relates to biotechnology about which considerable anxiety exists among developing countries. Within biotechnology, the genetically modified organisms, patenting on life forms such as animals or plants and transgenic crops or animals are the most controversial biotechnology. Although tissue culture reduces the diversity far more than conventional multiplication technologies, there is not much controversy on that. Similarly, fermentation technologies even if involving genetically modified organisms have not created any controversy so far. There are essentially five issues in this regard which need to be discussed, a) what is the nature of environmental risk inherent in a biotechnology, b) how does this risk compare to other risks that are being faced in a given society, c) what is the nature of disclosure of information and transfer of technology by the owner of proprietary technology to a developing country, d) what is the level of technological capability of the technology importing country and whether adequate norms and mechanisms exists for dealing with any negative externality on the environment, and e) what is the potential gain from the biotechnology and whether it is large enough to warrant the risk if any.

It is true that from the point of view of precautionary principle, if there is any doubt about technology, then it is better to err on the side of conservation rather than on the side of undue risk taking. Imagine if Indian planners had not taken the risk of importing seed of Mexican varieties from CIMMYT in 1966-67 when country was facing a severe drought, sanctions from US, stoppage of cheap food aid from US, the situation of India could really have been that of a basket case. There were lot of risks involved particularly when this kind of wheat had been tried only for couple of years and sufficient scientific data on environmental safety had not yet become available. But in the given geo-political conditions, Indian leadership took a decision and the rest is history. There have been many negative effects of this technology as well as the way it has been diffused. The weed infestation which began with a few plants has become a menace. Congress grass i.e. Parthenium sp. came along with food aid but Philaris minor came along with Mexican wheat. These were the risks that are responsible for tremendous amount of chemical use for weed control and these risks accompanied traditional technologies. Therefore, one has to be extremely careful in assessing risks and any country which does not have risk assessment capability, or does not have faith in similar capability of other countries, should have the right not to allow import of such risky technologies. Transmission of diseases, pests or weeds through food aid has happened for long. But this does not imply that risks should be taken in future too. Given the food security or vulnerability and depending upon the nature of technology, proprietary or public domain, concerned countries will have to decide what is appropriate for them. In the absence of Biosafety protocol, domestic Biosafety norms are the best safeguards for denying IPP to any transgenic variety. Patents per se do not provide right to the patent holder for its working. The manufacturing or production rights whether for drugs, chemicals or seeds are subject to the prevalent procedures in a given country. When sufficient public safety data does not exist about any technology, a country should have the right to refuse working of a technology even if intellectual property protection exists for the same.

d) Incentives for private investment in technologies which may generate public good through a system of incentives or licensing by national governments or international organizations for wider access.

He also feels that some of the large corporations should put genes relevant for the developing countries in private foundations so that developing countries could access them easily. In the case of public domain genes, it would soon be noticed that one needed more than access to patented technologies to be able to make any technological breakthrough. Juma rightly asserts that there are serious issues of path dependency and prior technological capacity that tend to be ignored.

e) Global markets for grassroots green innovations: linking innovation, investment, and enterprise

The experience of Honey Bee network with regard to scouting, documentation, value addition, and dissemination is quite illustrative of the dilemma that arise on the issue of IPR and environment from the grassroots perspective. Most of the ten thousand innovations and outstanding examples of traditional knowledge collected by Honey Bee network over last ten years are extremely conducive to environmental conservation or improvement and in some cases, restoration. However, unless incentives are evolved for local communities and individual innovators, there is no way these innovations will be improvised or in many cases diffused. If venture funds in one country have to invest in a small green innovation from another country to set up an enterprise in third country, the protection of intellectual property would be helpful in getting returns on these investments. This is only possible when there is a low transaction cost system of registration such as INSTAR (International Network for Sustainable Technology Application and Registration) proposed by SRISTI first in 1993. Idea is that at the time of review of TRIPS, a discussion is expected to start on international negotiation for registry of wines and spirits. There are three possibilities, I) this registry includes other products as well which are worth protecting through geographical indications ii) the scope of the registry is expanded to include innovation patents with ten years protection, five to seven claims per application and very low cost obtaining it in a short period of time, and iii) development of a new international regime for small grassroots innovation as distinct from traditional knowledge with varying duration of protection ranging from ten years for small contemporary improvements to 99 years for land races developed by the local communities as defined in the national constitution in a spatially bound manner. The purpose is to generate global markets for grassroots green innovations without which adequate incentives may not emerge to provide motivation for conservation of diversity. It must be stressed here that no national government has made very enthusiastic effort to provide incentives for conservation to local communities and individual innovators. An exception is the announcement by Indian government in the budget of 1999 to set up a National Innovation Foundation to develop a National register of innovations and provide various other kinds of help for scaling up these innovations and setting up incubators.

Large number of herbal pesticides, veterinary medicines, soil and water conservation technologies and other technologies for land and water use management, growing trees in drylands, making vegetaable dyes etc., have been documented. These innovations can become competitive by blending with formal science. The venture promotion funds can help scale of these innovations. One such fund was set up in March 1997 as a follow up of international conference on Creativity and Innovation at Grassroots held at IIM Ahmedabad. Gujarat government came forward to set up Gujarat Grassroots Innovation Augmentation Network (GIAN) in collaboration with SRISTI with initial corpus of about 110,000 USD to provide help to grassroots innovations. Several patents have been filed on behalf of small innovators and in few cases technologies have been licensed to entrepreneurs. Without the protection of intellectual property, many of these innovations will be easily copied and the innovators will remain as handicapped as they were to begin with, in terms of funding their own R&D. Either they must remain dependent on donations or grants from other NGOs or public institutions or they should raise resources through commercialization of their own innovations. In such cases intellectual property rights can help mobilize resources for scaling up the innovations and generating sharing of benefits.

Even if small contributions are made by the small scale entrepreneurs provided non-exclusive licenses along with know-how, reasonable incentives can be generated for the innovators. In cases, where technologies involved are selections from land races or local breeds of animals, the incentives have to be shared with the local communities. The experience of TBGRI in Kerala, India, is quite instructive in this regard.

Kani Tribe had known many plants of importance in curing diseases or providing energy when one is fatigued. Dr. Pushpangadan and Dr. Rajashekharan, when they were at Regional Research Laboratory at Jammu, pursued a survey of local knowledge in early 80s. They were walking through the forests along with the local Kani tribes. At one stage when they were extremely fatigued, they noticed that a plant consumed by the local tribal people was very helpful in boosting the energy. They tried this plant on themselves and found it very effective. Subsequently they did research on this plant and filed patent. Later, both of them moved to TBGRI and Dr. Pushpangadan started research on drug development. Very soon they developed an effective herbal drug which was licensed to an ayurvedic drug manufacturing company in Kerala. At this stage that Dr. Pushpangadan planned to share 50 per cent of the royalty with Kani tribe people. His intention was to provide share of benefits so that Kani community could start cultivation of this plant in the original habitat (because the plants were not very effective when cultivated outside their original native niche). He thought of transferring funds to state tribal corporation. At this stage, he met the author, Prof. Gupta and was advised to help Kanis in setting up their own Trust to manage the royalty entirely according to their own wishes. Accordingly a trust was set up and the royalty has been transferred to the trust with the understanding that only interest on the royalty will be spent in a year. While Forest Department is creating difficulties for various reasons, the fact remains that one has to work with them if value addition in the knowledge of other tribals has to generate similar opportunities of benefit sharing. The environmental benefits of cultivating a herb will certainly reduce pressure on the wild biodiversity.

This example shows that even in the domestic market intellectual property can help in generating incentives through value addition and benefit sharing with the local communities.

Indian representation made to the 1999 ministerial conference on IPR issues in February made several interesting points, a) the nature of technology transfer had changed significantly in 90s compared to 80s. The effective transfer of technology at fair and reasonable costs to developing countries would require harmonization of the objectives of WTO and TRIPS agreements. India had proposed in the committee on trade and environment that owners of environmentally sound technology and product should sell such technologies and products at fair and most favourable terms and conditions upon demand to any interested party which has an obligation to adopt these under national law of another country or under international law. In the absence of international technology funding mechanisms, acquisition of appropriate technology by poor countries or firms therein would become very difficult. Given the goal of WTO to achieve sustainable development, it is necessary that TRIPS provisions be modified in the November meeting in several ways. (a) right of holders of traditional knowledge to share benefits arising out of innovations in the resources and knowledge conserved by them. The biological material conserved by the local communities should be allowed to be used only if a material transfer agreement and information transfer agreement have been executed. The Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement would have to be modified. To include requirement for every patent applicant to disclose that knowledge and/or biological diversity used in the patent application has been obtained lawfully and rightfully i.e. through prior informed concerned. Such applications, however, should be made public so as to invite wider scrutiny of the claims by local community. The applications which are considered safe for environment may be given a fast track. Likewise filing fees may be reduced or eliminated for environmental friendly innovations.

David Downes has pleaded for several years for studying the interface between IPP and environment through imaginative use of provisions of existing intellectual property rights and has suggested modifications where limitations are felt. Gollin has also suggested the need for using IPP for environmental protection.

Room for Maneuver: patents for conservation

A: Demand Route:

1. IPP can create incentives for right holders of traditional varieties of crop or horticultural plants to create demand for these products sothat they have incentives for conservation. The trading channels such as fair trade intermediaries or even major super chains may invest in promoting ethnic or less known foods and crafts when protected through relevant IPP so that rent on promotional investment can be extracted. In organic agriculture, the blending of agro-biodiversity with organic certification has generated incentives for local communities and individual farmers in several countries. Most of the compulsively organic farmers( that is organic because of less developed markets, uneven terrain, rain fed regions, and poor economic conditions), also cnserve and grow land races and local breeds of animals. In some places thee exist high demand for eggs of local scavenger poultry breeds which commands premium over batery managed poultry. Thus market mediated incentives can be complimented with non-market ones and IPPs ( plant variey protection, geographical indications, etc.,) can be used to increase incentives of conservators as also the investors in the market chains.

2. Geographical indications for the forest and biodiversity based crafts and other natural products can generate demand for these gods and thsu enhance incentives for conservation if appropriate institutions are also simultaneously built to generate long term stakes, tgther with security of tenures for local communities over the basic resources. After the recent 73^rd amendment of Indian constitution, tribal communities in designated areas have been made owners of all non-timber forest produce and thus new avenues emerge for developing their market access combined with the ethic of sustainable extraction of resources.

3. Trademarks, folk lore protection, and other kind of protection for local cultural artifacts, music styles and art forms may increase economic incentives for local communities and thus improve the probability of people staying in the biodiversity and the knowledge rich regions. If the emigration continues at the present alarming rate from these regions, the possibility of co-evolutionary processes for conservation continuing is remote. Thus any incentive that helps local communities to stay in the region without remaining poor, will help in conservation to. Obviously, we can not conserve biodiversity by keeping people poor( Gupta, 1991) as many conservationists seem to suggest( for they fear that improvement in economic opportunities will not help local communities conserve resources). Indirect incentives must also receive adequate attention. GEF suggests that providing such incentives may be a national obligation and thus avoids financing such incremental costs. It may be right `technically’ but then the result will be that biodiversity will not be conserved.

B: Supply Route

5. WIPO could administer an international registry of small green innovations so as to achieve the goals of point 4 above. This could supplement the national innovation system, with shorter duration, quick registration( with in three months), lower inventive threshold, lesser number of claims( 5-7), and easy access to any one from any part of the world through Internet as well conventional means. Honey Bee database can provide the initial spur for the purpose.

6. Collective management of intellectual property rights should also be explored. Given the high transaction costs of standard intellectual property rights, if association of healers, herbalists, or other artisans could file, maintain, license and recover the dues, it will parallel a very god example created by performers’ associations.

7. Concession in cost of applications (lesser fees, or no fees in case of small green inventors), other forms of assistance, longer duration for local landraces (99 years), just as to aid pharma industry, many patent offices like in Australia are allowing extension in the patent term due to time lost in getting FDA approvals. Similarly, local communities and informal breeders and innovators may be given some concessions for not having filed for protection so far. Indian Plant Variety and Farmers’ Right Bill provides for registration of farmers’ varieties also. It also enables the local communities to enforce their rights through their own bodies, or through NGOs, and the Gene fund (in which seed companies are supposed to put a share of their profits) is supposed to provide a share to local providers of genetic diversity and thus providing incentives to local communities to conserve ( Gupta, 1999).

8. The costs for green innovations may also be disclosed in proportion to the extent of prior art disclosed just as fees is supposed to be increased in some countries( at least the discussion is on) in proportion to the number of claims filed.

9. There is a need for International Fund for dissemination, demonstration, setting up clearing houses, generating demand for these small green innovations etc.

10. Local Language multi-media DATABASEs need to be created to help lateral learning among local communities about green innovations being developed by various communities world over. There is hardly any investment being made in enhancing capacity of local communities to learn from each other about each others’ innovations without eroding respective intellectual property rights. I had made this point also when UNEP had organized an informal consultation years ago on CHM for biodiversity and environmental conservation. Why should otherwise local communities share any of their knowledge, innovation and practices with outside world. Ethics of extraction must change.

11. A UNEP paper in 1996 ( UNEP/CBD/3/72/96) argued that intellectual property rights may help conservation by increasing yield of crops and thus reducing pressure for bringing marginal lands under cultivation. The problem with this formulation is that the yield may increase in irrigated areas while the biodiversity is generally maintained in rain fed regions for which thee are few HYVs. Thus we need to have constant review of various measures proposed to improve conservation goals through stricter intellectual property rights and various assertions including mine must be subjected to critical empirical scrutiny periodically. It is just that we already have examples of improvement in income flows to local innovators through IP protection.

12. Research and Development (R and D) contracts between informal innovators and formal scientific institutions must be facilitated through international fund for green innovations. CG institutions must be persuaded by various donors to allocate part of their funds and human resources precisely for this purpose. Private sector can also be involved in these contracts wherever possible.

13. Intellectual property rights are also supposed to contribute to decline in diversity of seeds. My argument is just the opposite. Major decline in diversity took place through green revolution technologies and changes in habitat conditions. In fact farmers’ innovations can be protected without much transaction costs, it may add to the diversity. The notion that only big companies and that too MNCs will gain through better protection is not true from Asian examples.

In addition, we need to create mechanisms for acquisition and transfer of technologies for safer treatment of hazardous waste generated internally or imported from abroad already without having safer technologies in place. This is a serious threat to environment. Power projects generate millions of tons of fly ash and many other wastes, all over the world but mechanisms for technology transfer are not in place. I am not sure that technologies are not being traded only because of Intellectual Property Rights. It is possible that these are costly, not efficient as yet or are only pilot scale technologies. But if we have viable technologies anywhere in the world for using any bio-waste or other wastes, then their applications for solving global problems must be generated. Why will any one otherwise invest in generation of such technologies.

The local communities and innovators must likewise incentives to share their green innovations, get it protected so that investments flow and the incomes are generated.

Colborn, Theo; Dumanoski, Dianne and Myers, John Peterson, 1999, Our Stolen Future, Penguin Books USA Inc.

David R. Downes and Sarah A. Laird, 1999, Innovative Mechanisms for Sharing Benefits of Biodiversity and Related Knowledge: Case Studies on Geographical Indications and Trademarks, with contributions by Graham Dutfield and Rachel Wynberg, Prepared for UNCTAD Biotrade Initiative

Gupta, Anil K., 1991, Why does poverty persist in regions of high biodiversity?: A case for indigenous property right system, Paper invited for the International conference on Property Rights and Genetic Resources sponsored by IUCN, UNEP and ACTS at Kenya, June 10- 16.

--------------------, 1998, Intellectual Property Rights of Grassroots Innovators: Issues and Concerns, presented at National Seminar on "Biodiversity Conservation: Challenges and Opportunities" held at Forest Research Institute, Dehra Dun on October 10.

--------------------, 1998, Strategic Opportunities in Managing IPRs: Biodiversity, Drug Industry and Emerging Options, IIMA Working Paper No.98-12-11, December.

--------------------, 1999, Linking Grassroots Innovations, Enterprise, Investments, Incentives and Institutions: Democratising Knowledge Through Honey Bee Network.

--------------------, 1999, Implications of WTO On Indian Agriculture: The Case Of Intellectual Property Rights And Emerging Biosafety Protocol.

--------------------, 1999, Making Indian Agriculture more Knowledge Intensive and Competitive: The Case of Intellectual Property Rights, keynote paper prepared for 59th Annual Conference of The Indian Society of Agricultural Economics to be held in December 1999