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## 2 Complying with article 39 of TRIPS... a myth or evolving reality?

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### 6 Abstract

7 In the lengthy process for a new pharmaceutical material to progress from innovation to marketplace, the crucial step of gaining  
8 statutory authorisation to offer the product to the public involves the creation of large volumes of data. This article explores the way  
9 in which this data is, could, or should be protected. Aspects covered include the relevant articles of TRIPS (39 and 70.9), and the  
10 protection potentially provided by official secrets acts, trade secrets and confidentiality provisions and exclusive marketing rights.  
11 The article concludes with a tabulated summary of the relevant legislation, and term of protection provided, in over 60 countries  
12 worldwide.

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14 *Keywords:* Pharmaceutical inventions; Statutory authorisation; Proprietary data; Data protection; TRIPS; Official secrets acts; Trade secrets;  
15 Confidentiality provisions; Exclusive marketing rights; Worldwide legislation

### 16 1. Introduction

17 Intellectual property rights (IPR) has evolved over  
18 the years as a strategic tool to create and sustain com-  
19 petitive positions in the global marketplace. Patents  
20 protect inventions that are novel, non-obvious and  
21 demonstrate utility. Patent laws in most countries give a  
22 protection term of 20 years from the date of filing the  
23 complete specification.

24 In the field of pharmaceuticals, foods and agro-  
25 chemicals, marketing of products require statutory  
26 clearances from National Regulatory Bodies. The  
27 mandatory clearances are meant to ensure that the  
28 products to be introduced in the public domain satisfy  
29 certain minimum criteria of quality, efficacy, safety,  
30 environmental friendliness, toxicological clearance, etc.  
31 Generating such data generally involve elaborate ex-  
32 perimentation, trials in various phases, chemical analy-  
33 sis, and estimation of impact on the environment, which  
34 can be time consuming and expensive.

### 2. Pharmaceutical patentees: protection of proprietary data—general considerations 35 36

37 Thus to carve a competitive position an organisation 37  
38 would seek exclusivity with granted patents in different 38  
39 countries for its business interest and also through 39  
40 protection of its proprietary data generated and sub- 40  
41 mitted by it for the statutory clearances from the ap- 41  
42 propriate governmental bodies. It may be appreciated 42  
43 that the clearances from the statutory bodies are man- 43  
44 datory for all products to be marketed, whether pat- 44  
45 entable, patented or otherwise. If patented, protection 45  
46 extends to the invention, but not to the data generated 46  
47 by the innovator. It is therefore clear that the concept of 47  
48 patents and exclusivity of propriety test data are dis- 48  
49 tinctly different, but are complementary to each other in 49  
50 building a competitive platform for the innovators and 50  
51 marketers. 51

52 It has been debated for sometime whether it is nec- 52  
53 essary for the State to provide for a separate statutory 53  
54 platform, since it may be considered that propriety test 54  
55 data generated and submitted to governmental author- 55  
56 ities to obtain marketing approvals is protected by the 56  
57 terms of confidentiality in favour of the owner of such 57  
58 data. 58

59 Arguments in favour of the proprietor of such data 59  
60 requiring governmental authorities to maintain confi- 60

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61 dentiality of proprietary test data as described above  
62 may be justified in economic terms due to the high costs  
63 involved in generation of the data. On the other hand  
64 several governments have limited the “originator’s”  
65 proprietary data rights only to a brief period of exclu-  
66 sivity, because of their concern about the repetitive use  
67 of animals, humans and other resources for repetitive  
68 tests/trials by the “follower” organisations to generate  
69 their own data independently.

70 There are other countries, which do not have any  
71 explicit data protection laws and appear to depend upon  
72 their National Official Secrets Acts that bind the public  
73 servants from disclosing or using confidential informa-  
74 tion in an unauthorised manner that may affect the se-  
75 curity, sovereignty and integrity of the country

### 76 3. Official Secrets Acts

77 A key question is whether the protection under the  
78 Official Secrets Acts in different countries provide ap-  
79 propriate and adequate protection to originators of their  
80 proprietary test data and whether they mandate the  
81 governments not to disclose or rely on the proprietary  
82 data for the marketing approval of “generic” (“follow-  
83 er”) copies of the pharmaceutical products without the  
84 explicit approval of the originator, at least for a rea-  
85 sonable period. Another point to be debated is whether  
86 the countries, which tend to believe that the Official  
87 Secrets Acts provide the necessary protection, have built  
88 in mechanisms within the meaning of such Acts, for the  
89 originators to enforce their rights for the proprietary test  
90 data. Even the US Trade Secret Laws have proved to be  
91 inadequate for protecting proprietary data submitted to  
92 regulatory authorities. The position of the courts in  
93 exploiting the Trade Secrets Law in the event that the  
94 authorities rely on the data submitted to them earlier by  
95 the originator, to evaluate the application of the “fol-  
96 lower” is not clear. Moreover a few cases have been  
97 decided on “public policy” grounds but the difficulties  
98 faced by the originators have been inordinately high.

### 99 4. TRIPS: Article 70.9 EMR

100 In the context of TRIPS, one may argue that the  
101 “exclusive marketing rights” (EMR) conferred under  
102 Article 70.9 for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemi-  
103 cal products provides for indirect protection of the data  
104 submitted by the “originator” which secured such au-  
105 thorisation, and that designation stops a second appli-  
106 cant for authorisation during the term of the EMR even  
107 if the “follower”/generic company generates its own  
108 data. However the concept of EMR is organically con-  
109 nected to the originator having obtained a patent and  
110 approval to market the drug in at least in one member

country of the WTO. It does not protect the test data for 111  
items that either is not patentable or for which patents 112  
have not yet been granted. 113

### 5. TRIPS : Article 39—protection of undisclosed infor- 114 mation 115

Article 39.3 of TRIPS explicitly recognises the sig- 116  
nificance of “protection of undisclosed information” as 117  
another category of IPR. It states: 118

Members when requiring as a condition of approv-  
ing the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricul-  
tural chemical entities, the submission of  
undisclosed test or other data, the origination of  
which involves a *considerable effort*, shall protect  
such data against *unfair commercial use*. In addi-  
tion, members shall *protect such data against disclo-  
sure*, except where necessary to protect the public,  
or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data  
are protected against unfair commercial use.

The Article 39.3 should be read in conjunction with 129  
Article 39.1 and Article 39.2 for a full appreciation of 130  
scope and spirit of the Article 39.3. 131

Article 39.1 states: 132

In the general course of ensuring effective protec-  
tion against unfair competition as provided in Arti-  
cle 10 bis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members  
shall protect undisclosed information in accordance  
with paragraph 2 and data submitted to govern-  
ments or government agencies in accordance of pa-  
ragraph 3.

Article 39.2 states: 140

Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility  
of preventing information lawfully within their con-  
trol from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used  
by others without their consent in a manner con-  
trary to honest commercial practice so long as such  
information:

- is secret in the sense that it is not as a body or in the  
precise configuration and assembly of its compo-  
nents, generally known or readily accessible to per-  
sons within the circles that normally dealt with the  
kind of information in question;
- has commercial value because it is secret; and 152
- has been subject to reasonable steps under the cir-  
cumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the  
information to be kept secret.

It may be noted that for the purposes of this provi- 156  
sion, “a manner contrary to honest commercial prac- 157

Table 1  
A survey of data exclusivity legislation in over 60 countries worldwide

Country	Protection term	Relevant legislation
Canada	5 years	Food and Drug Regulations, Section C.08.004.1 outlining the conditions under which “the Minister” may or may not issue a notice of compliance in cases where a manufacturer files a new drug submission, an abbreviated new drug submission, a supplement to a new drug submission or a supplement to a new drug submission for the purpose of establishing the safety and effectiveness of the new drug for which the submission or supplement is filed
Mexico	5 years	Article 1711. Trade Secrets, NAFTA
USA	5 years	Food and Drug Law. Section 505 (355) (D)
Costa Rica	5 years	Article 9—Abbreviated documentation for the Authorisation of a Pharmaceutical Preparation. Article 10—Mandatory Licenses after the Expiration of the Period. Article 11—Definition of an Essentially similar Medication. Article 12—Documentation and Data Exclusivity compliance
El Salvador	Not specified	Article 177 and 178 of Law of the Development and Protection of Intellectual Property. Essentially protects any information that may be considered as Trade Secrets
Guatemala	15 years	Article 177—Industrial Property Law; protecting “Trade Secrets”; Governmental Agreement no. 89–2002 Article 87 “Protection of evidence or other information” outlining specific requirements from the applicant while submitting the data while seeking protection
Honduras	Not specified	Industrial Property Law, Article 73 and 74 for protection of trade secrets related to the commercialisation or sale of pharmaceutical or agrochemical products that contain a new chemical component
Nicaragua	Not specified	Article 125—of Nicaragua New Law of Patents for implementing regulations for the Drug and Medication Statute
Panama	10 years	Legislative Assembly Law no. 23; Section 7: Protection of undisclosed information—Article 39. Covers all aspects of Article 39 of TRIPS explicitly
Trinidad & Tobago	Not specified	Article 27/1996—Protection against unfair competition
Cuba; Dominican Republic	–	No 39.3 data protection
Bolivia	5 years	Andean Pact Article 266 of decision 486 dated 12/1/2000
Brazil	Not specified	Chapter VI crimes of unfair competition Article 195
Colombia	5 years	Andean Pact Article 266 of decision 486 dated 12/1/2000
Colombia; Mexico & Venezuela	Not specified	Treaty of the group of three. Article 18-22: Data Protection of Chemicals used for Pharmaceutical Purposes or Agrochemicals
Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela	5 years	Andean Pact Article 266 of decision 486 dated 12/1/2000
Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay	–	No 39.3 data protection
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain	6 years	Article 10 (1)(a)(iii) of EC Directive 2001/83
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom	10 years	Article 10 (1)(a)(iii) of EC Directive 2001/83
Switzerland	5 years	Decree on Medications; Section 3, Article 17
Turkey	Not specified	Annex 8 on Protection of Industrial and Commercial Property of the Customs Union Agreement
Czech Republic	6 years	Section 32 of Law No. 79/1997 Coll. On Drugs
Estonia	6 years	Article 2—Submission of Application for marketing Authorisation Article 2.5 and Article 2.11
Hungary	6 or 10 years based on satisfaction of certain criteria	Health Ministerial Decree 12/2001 on Registration and marketing approval of drugs for Human use—Section 26
Latvia	6 or 10 years based on satisfaction of certain criteria	Normative Documentation of Republic of Latvia Pharmacy Regulations, Article 18-20
Poland	3 years	Act of 6 September 2001, Pharmaceutical Law Article 15.1
Romania	6 or 10 years based on satisfaction of certain criteria	Draft Reglementation Law
Russia	Not specified	Article 39—Civil Code—Business or Commercial Secret
Slovak Republic	6 years	Coll. On Drugs and Sanitation Facilities
Slovenia	6 years	Article 15, Medical Act
Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania	–	No 39.3 Data Protection
Egypt	5 years	Peoples Assembly Committees Undisclosed Information—Articles 55–62, Prime Minister Decree No. 1211 Concerning Data Exclusivity of Chemical, Agricultural and Pharmaceutical Products

Table 1 (continued)

Country	Protection term	Relevant legislation
Jordan	5 years	Article (8)—Unfair Competition Law
Saudi Arabia	Not specified	Provides de facto Article 39.3 protection; no separate legislation
South Africa	Not specified	Medicines Control Act 101 of 1995, Section 34
Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria	—	No 39.3 Data Protection
Australia	5 years	Data Exclusivity Provision of the Therapeutic Goods Act(Cth) 1989 (Australia). 25A
China	6 Years	Implementing Regulation of Drug Administration Law of China Article 31—Draft of February 19, 2002; Report of Working Party on Accession of China to WTO
Hong Kong	Not specified	Pharmacy and Ordinance Act
Japan	6 years	Japanese Drug Regulation Article 18-3
Korea	4 or 6 years based on satisfaction of certain criteria	Article 26-2 of the PAL; Article 5, Paragraph 11 of the KFDA Regulations Regarding the Safety and Efficacy Examination of Drug Products
New Zealand	5 years	23B. Medicines Act 1981
Pakistan	Not specified	Section 43 of the Drugs Act 1976. The Act provides de facto 39.3 protection. It permits the Federal Government to frame the necessary secondary (subordinate) legislation to carry out the purposes of the Act. The relevant rules are the Drugs (Licensing, Registering and Advertising) Rules 1976. Section 40 of the Act lays down the conditions under which the Government can publish the result of test or analysis or public information or in public interest
Singapore	5 years	Medicines (amendment) Act of 1998; New Sections 19A and 19B. These deal with the protection of confidential supporting information about innovative medicinal products. It requires the government to take reasonable steps to ensure that the confidential supporting information is kept confidential by the licensing authority during the period and that it shall not use that confidential supporting information for the purposes of determining whether to grant any other application
Thailand	Not specified	Trade Secret Act Chapter 3, Section 15
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan	—	No 39.3 Data Protection

Source: Generated by the author based on the text in a publication of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, July 2002.

158 tices” shall mean at least practices such as breach of  
159 contract, breach of confidence and inducement to  
160 breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed in-  
161 formation by third parties who know, or were grossly  
162 negligent in failing to know, that such practices were  
163 involved in the acquisition.

164 In practice, to get national laws compliant with Ar-  
165 ticle 39 the following steps are needed:

- Pass independent legislation related to the protection of undisclosed information with exception provisions for public use.
- Explore the possibility of introducing subordinate legislation appropriately in an existing law such as the Drug and Cosmetic Act 1940 as is applicable in India.
- Explicitly define the nature of information that is protectable under the legislation and the term of such protection.
- Define the role and conduct of the Appropriate Statutory Authorities clearly with respect to their activities in the formal marketing approval process.

- Respect and recognise the considerable effort of the originator in the development of the test data and give the originator data exclusivity.
- Protect data against disclosure by the authorities and treat the originator’s submitted data as secret information.
- Define the legitimate rights of the originator who submitted the test data in the dossier to the statutory authorities.
- De-link the issue of protection of proprietary data from any of the articles in TRIPS dealing with patent or other forms of intellectual property rights such as design registration, trademarks, geographical indications, etc.
- Build-in the framework for effective enforcement in the event of infringement or violation of the provisions of the enacted law.
- Construct an effective competition law with in-built provisions for data exclusivity and enforcement against unfair commercial use.

199 5.1. Protection against unfair commercial use

200 Though the Article does not explicitly define “unfair  
201 commercial use”, one is expected to interpret it by  
202 keeping in mind the spirit and principle of the Article by  
203 referring to the development process of this Article. The  
204 discussions while formulating this Article were directed  
205 towards setting up a framework to prevent any direct or  
206 indirect reliance by the statutory authority in any  
207 country on the originator’s proprietary data in the  
208 submitted dossier, without the originator’s consent, in  
209 the consideration/review of a “follower’s” application  
210 for registration of a generic drug.

211 6. In practice—worldwide

212 It may be appreciated that there is no uniform stan-  
213 dard that is followed by the countries while introducing  
214 and implementing the laws related to exclusivity of test  
215 data and protection of undisclosed information. How-  
216 ever there is a common principle that is followed in that  
217 the laws generally specify the conditions under which  
218 data exclusivity can be sought and the period for which  
219 the “originator” can enjoy the exclusivity after the  
220 marketing approval is granted in the country, which is  
221 typically between 5 and 10 years. For example in some  
222 European Countries in their implementation of the  
223 European provisions conferring protection of regulatory  
224 data in relation to medicinal products do not confer  
225 such protection “after patent expiry”. The regime for  
226 medicinal products in the USA confers a shorter period  
227 of protection on a second applicant who challenges any  
228 patent, which also protects the product. In the USA  
229 there are specific procedures for notifying the patent  
230 holders who wish to be alerted to a third party request  
231 for approval of a product covered by a patent. Article  
232 1711 dealing with Trade Secrets of the North American  
233 Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) paragraphs 5 through  
234 7 have also incorporated provisions that broadly cover  
235 protection of undisclosed information.

236 The brief survey below (Table 1) illustrates the ap-  
237 proaches taken by various countries while implementing

their domestic laws related to data protection and 238  
granting exclusivity to proprietary data and informa- 239  
tion. 240

7. Conclusion 241

The considerations discussed above and the existing 242  
legislation could serve as a guide for the legislators in 243  
various developing and least developed countries while 244  
formulating their own national laws related to this issue. 245  
Whatever the form of the protection offered it is im- 246  
perative that that all member states of the WTO comply 247  
with the provisions of Article 39.3 to protect the interest 248  
of the innovators and originators and provide a healthy 249  
platform to encourage investments and innovation for 250  
societal benefit. It is relevant to note that according to 251  
the timetable set by TRIPS for WTO member countries, 252  
the Developed and the Developing Countries (with the 253  
exception of the least developed countries) were ex- 254  
pected, with certain exceptions—such as product patent 255  
protection, to have their TRIPS legislation in place by 1 256  
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