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| Success on the Commons: A Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource Management in the villages of Yamanak, Hirano and Nagaike, located on the slopes of Mount Fuji |
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Reference |
| McKean, Margareth A.: "Success on the Commons: A Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource Management.", unpublished paper, Duke University, 1988. |
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Introduction to the Institution |
| The study describes institutions set up for managing common property in the villages of Yamanak, Hirano and Nagaike, located on the slopes of Mount Fuji. Generally there is no references to specific rules used in a specific village. The information in this record can only be seen as examples of principles used in the villages - not as a consistent set of rules used in one particular institution\village. Each of the villages has an exclusive parcel of common property land, and along with several other villages, they share a large expanse of meadows which extends towards the summit of Mount Fuji. |
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Coverage of the Institution |
| The paper indicates that similar institutions was found and can be found all over Japan. The institution is concurrent. |
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Rules for Management
of the Institution |
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(a) Boundary Rules |
| SPATIAL BOUNDARIES: The villages of Yamanak, Hirano and Nagaike.
SOCIAL BOUNDARIES: All residents of the villages who contribute their full duty to the commons. Households who migrate to other areas, but maintain their property in the villages will normally not be given access, as they do not contribute. Within the villages, villagers belong to a "Kumi", a geographic sub-area of the village, which often is used as the basic unit of allocating resources from the commons. Thus, it was important that the Kumi's were of equal size. |
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(b) Governance
rules |
| Users have to convene regularly in a deliberative body to make decisions about opening and closing the commons, about harvest dates and about the rules governing the commons. This could either be a full assembly or an indirect body composed of representatives of each Kumi. Maintenance rules: The villages also set up rules for maintenance, such as weeding on small commons, tree cropping in woodlots, cutting of firebreaks and monitoring the annual spring burning of large meadows. Accounts are kept to assure that each kumi and each household make its proper contribution of labour and only take its proper share of the harvest. Commons are monitored by taking turns in patrolling the areas to enforce rules and apprehend violators from other villages. In Yamanaka, were households could not afford to spare an able bodied adult for the patrol, villagers had authority to use citizens arrest to capture violators. When violators are caught, they are immediately deprived of their contraband, tools and pack animals and they are ordered a fine. Penalties escalate with the severity of the violation and the arrogance of offenders. On rare occasions it culminate in exclusion or banishment - first from the commons, then from other social and economic functions of the village and finally from the village itself. |
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(c) Resource Allocation |
| By the 19th century, and maybe earlier, rules were set up to regulate which products could be taken from the commons, how much of each could be taken, how much which had to be left behind, which tools could be used for harvesting and transportation and how harvested products should be allocated within the village. For items that were produced on abundance, villagers could be allowed free and open access, as long as they assured permission ahead of time and carried an entry permit, and as long as they followed the rules of leaving back a self-sustaining population. For resources in scarce supply, which has to be protected until maturity, closed reserves were set aside. Different rules applied when reserves were open; people might be allowed to come and go as they liked: they might be allowed to enter in groups only, usually with their Kumi; particular zones of the reserves could be closed to visitors, or acces to these zones could be rotated from kumi to kumi or from household to household or assigned at random at each harvest. Villagers might be allowed to take all from a zone assigned to them, or the amount could be limited, e.g. only what one person could carry. Finally, villagers maybe had to contribute some or all of their harvest to village- or kumiwide pools, for redistribution among community members. |
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Conflict Resolution Mechanism |
| Only two major conflicts have occured within the institution, although minor rule violations, e.g. villagers entering closed reserves before opening day, happens relatively often. The first major conflict was over a wealthy village elder who thought himself above the law and did no longer abide the rules of the commons. The second was concerning a village headman who would not open the closed reserve, although everybody else thought it should be done. This made the leading households enter the commons before opening day collectively in peacefull mutiny. The violators accepted the villagers right to punish them and gave a big contribution to the local school in compensation. But the message got across to the headman. The author suggests that the opening day of the commons was often a subject of disagreement between the villagers, but the two examples given are the most extreme outcomes of these conflicts. |
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Problems Faced by Institution |
| Not reported |
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Changes in the Institution over time |
| During the Tokugawa period many commons throughout Japan were split up in private parcels by agreement among the former co-owners of the commons. Reportedly there are two major easons for this change. Firstly, some communities could not set up well-functioning rules and institutional designs for governing the commons. Thus, they opted for private ownership instead of bad communal governance. Secondly, commons were privatized in villages located near to cities or convenient transportation. Market access enchanced commercialization and specialization. Regions could specialize in crops on which they had a comparative advantage, and relying on the traditional products of the commons became uneconomical. The villages described in this study did not go through this privatization, as adequate rules and institutions for governing the commons were present, and as they were not exposed to major changes in the local economy, due to their limited access to the market. |
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Other Features of Institution |
| The study suggests, that due to the stress Common Property Institutions were exposed to during the Tokugawa period, the institutions which have survived are likely to represent the strongest institutional frameworks. |
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Purpose |
| Common Property Management. |
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Country |
| Japan. |
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Region |
| Mount Fuji. |
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Date Of Publication |
| TroB 200396 |
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